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Abstract—Pre-defined security metrics suffer from the problem of contextualisation, i.e. a lack of adaptability to particular
organisational contexts – domain, technical infrastructure, stakeholders, business process, etc. Adapting metrics to an organisational
context is essential (1) for the metrics to align with business requirements (2) for decision makers to maintain relevant security goals
based on measurements from the field. In this paper we propose SYMBIOSIS, a methodology that defines a goal elicitation and
refinement process mapping business objectives to security measurement goals via the use of systematic templates that capture
relevant context elements (business goals, purpose, stakeholders, system scope). The novel contribution of SYMBIOSIS is the
well-defined process, which enforces that (1) metrics align with business objectives via a top-down derivation that refines top-level
business objectives to a manageable granularity (2) the impact of metrics on business objectives is explicitly traced via a bottom-up
feedback mechanism, allowing an incremental approach where feedback from metrics influences business goals, and vice-versa. In
this paper, we discuss the findings from applying SYMBIOSIS to three case studies of known security incidents. Our analysis shows
how the aforementioned pitfalls of security metrics development processes affected the outcome of these high-profile security incidents
and how SYMBIOSIS addresses such issues.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Security metrics play a fundamental role in security
decision-making and relative prioritisation of security re-
quirements within an organisation. Critically, if security
metrics can effectively capture the realisation of business
objectives, this can ensure that security fits with organi-
sational goals. On the other hand, such alignment of se-
curity metrics with business objectives can allow decision
makers to evolve and update objectives based on relevant
measurements in the field. Reference information security
metrics sources such as NIST 800-55 [24] and ISO 27004 [15]
focus on the measurement process itself and propose to
reuse pre-defined, supposedly universal, security metrics.
Such approaches suffer from two key limitations that are
addressed by SYMBIOSIS (see Fig. 1):
1) Lack of contextualisation: Capturing the relevant
technical and organisational factors that influence
security in a particular organisation is critical in or-
der to design relevant measurements. In the absence
of a clear design methodology, supposedly univer-
sal metrics are hard to adapt effectively to particular
organisations, domains and contexts [8]. A well-
defined contextualisation is also necessary to trace
and continuously adapt metrics to ever-evolving
security landscapes, organisational constraints and
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business contexts. A particular challenge is that of
capturing the interplay between a (possibly com-
plex) technical infrastructure and a (possibly com-
plex) organisation: a misunderstanding of who does
what in such a socio-technical context can hide
critical design failures.
2) Lack of alignment between security metrics
and business objectives: Lack of contextualisation
makes it difficult to align security metrics and busi-
ness objectives. On the one hand, security metrics
must align with business objectives, in a top-down
fashion, in order to take into account the specific
risk factors (cost, impact on resources, business con-
tinuity) of the organisation. On the other hand, feed-
back from security measurements has to be carried
bottom-up for strategic business decisions to better
integrate concrete security risks and situations from
the field. Such a process must be traceable, repeat-
able and incremental, in order for an organisation to
adapt continuously to a changing threat landscape,
as well as its own business evolution.
Goal-driven approaches to security measurements such
as [14], [16], [23] do promote a more structured way of de-
signing information security metrics and discuss the align-
ment of business objectives and security goals. However,
they lack a systematic definition of goals and measurements,
such as comprehensive templates to capture various facets
of the goals and measurements, nor do they provide a
detailed derivation methodology. This lack of a systematic
approach limits the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of
the resulting metrics with respect to business objectives in a
2Fig. 1. Gaps in state-of-the-art and novel contributions of SYMBIOSIS.
reproducible way.
Approaches addressing such concerns have previously
been designed for, and applied with great success to the
Software Engineering industry, guiding the creation of
goal-driven metrics for various projects. The most promi-
nent amongst those approaches include the Goal-Question-
Metric (GQM) approach [2]. GQM and its successors –
GQ(I)M [20] and GQM+ [1] – provide a well-defined
methodology to contextualise the creation of metrics, e.g.
for assessing software quality and team productivity.
Establishing security metrics raises specific concerns
however. Security goals are often orthogonal – and some-
times contradictory – to business concerns: confidentiality
concerns requiring to reduce the availability of an asset, for
instance. In addition, security is a crosscutting concern that
overlaps usual organisational structures and requires the
collaboration of different, potentially conflicting, stakehold-
ers: Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), engineers,
managers, policy makers, decision makers, third parties,
etc [9]. Capturing this organisational dimension of security
is a challenge [27], and as a result, aligning security mea-
surements with business objectives is still difficult.
In this paper, we propose SYMBIOSIS (SecuritY Metrics
and BusIness ObjectiveS, Integrated and Synchronised), a
methodology that promotes the integration of business
goals, organisational context and security risks into the
security metrics development process. SYMBIOSIS builds
on the foundations of GQM and provides security-specific
templates and methodological elements to contextualise se-
curity metrics and align them with business objectives. The
novel contributions of SYMBIOSIS are as follows (cf. Fig. 1):
● A goal elicitation and refinement process that defines
business objectives and refines them progressively,
down to a manageable granularity where concrete
security measurement goals and metrics can be es-
tablished. The process uses systematic templates to
contextualise the business objectives, measurement
goals and metrics with respect to the technical and
organisational specificities of the case at hand.● Awell-definedmeasurement process that ensures the
traceability of metrics back to security and business
objectives, explicating their impact and facilitating
their integration and co-evolution with business pro-
cesses, via an incremental approach.
SYMBIOSIS is the first methodology to cover security
from the highest level of decision making to the concrete
practice of measurements while encompassing both tech-
nical and organisational aspects. It integrates several or-
thogonal dimensions usually not considered together: reg-
ulatory compliance, privacy policies, privacy control and
enforcement, and operational considerations such as “how
to enforce the policy” and “what to do when a breach
is detected”. Such a comprehensive approach enables the
alignment of security metrics with a business perspective.
Such breadth of scope is complemented by SYMBIOSIS’s
adaptability, which allows to tailor the methodology to a
wide variety of cases, at small and large scales. It should
be noted, however, that SYMBIOSIS limits itself to modelling
business objectives, measurement goals and metrics, the re-
lation between them and the methodology to establish such
models. SYMBIOSIS does not, for the time being, provide
an explicit decision-making framework for driving security
strategies.
In the following, we discuss background and related
work on security metrics and GQM (Section 2). We then
introduce SYMBIOSIS, demonstrating it in detail through
application on a case study, along with a thorough dis-
cussion of its strengths and limitations (Section 3). We
present and discuss findings from applying SYMBIOSIS on
three comprehensive case studies, demonstrating how the
aforementioned pitfalls of security metrics development
processes affected the outcome of several high-profile se-
curity incidents and how SYMBIOSIS addresses such issues
(Section 4). Finally, we conclude the paper by summarising
the contributions of SYMBIOSIS and identifying directions
for future work (Section 5).
2 BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
We review related work on metrics with respect to two
evaluation criteria (summarised in Table 1):
● The contextualisation of security metrics with re-
spect to technical, organisational and security factors,
and whether or not systematic templates are used to
define such metrics.● The alignment between business objectives and secu-
rity metrics, including derivation of metrics from ob-
jectives, carrying feedback from metrics to business
objectives, and whether or not systematic templates
are used to define goals.
2.1 Reference Sources for Information Security Metrics
Reference sources such as NIST 800-55 [24], ISO 27004 [15],
CISWG [6], CIS Security Metrics [5] or securitymet-
rics.org [3] adopt a catalogue approach: they present various
reference metrics classified into categories and documented
with scenarios and examples. The intended audience is
expected to find and reuse metrics matching their needs,
however, little support is provided for finding the particular
use-cases that apply to the situation at hand.
Without a well-defined adaptation methodology (in the
case of CISWG [6], CIS Security Metrics [5] and security-
metrics.org [3]), the contextualisation of metrics relies on
arbitrary examples and use cases, which limits their expres-
siveness and precludes alignment with business objectives.
When a contextualisation methodology is available, it either
does not refer to business objectives, as is the case with ISO
27004 [15], or only promotes alignment with regulations and
laws, for instance, NIST 800-55 [24].
3TABLE 1
Positioning of SYMBIOSIS with respect to related work.
Standard Information Goal-Driven Approaches Goal-Oriented
GQM Methodologies
SYMBIOSISSecurity Metrics to Security Requirements Engineering
[24], [15], [6], [5], [3] [14], [16], [13], [23] [26], [25], [10] [2], [20], [1]
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2.2 Goal-driven approaches to information security
[14], [16], [13], [23] promote a more structured way of
designing information security measurements that takes
stakeholders and higher-level goals into account. However,
these approaches do not provide systematic templates for
goals, metrics and measurements and do not go deeper
than suggesting using a well-defined, step-by-step goal
elicitation process that would be tailored to security. As a
result, the adaptability and traceability supported by these
methods is still limited.
2.3 Goal-oriented requirements engineering
Contextualisation has been a core concern of the require-
ments engineering community. Goal languages such as
i∗ [26] and KAOS [25] have introduced comprehensive,
extensible models of stakeholders, systems, and the inter-
play between the two, including detailed goal templates
and taxonomies. These approaches are not meant to be
applied out of the box to security settings. More specific
frameworks have been developed for particular use cases,
see, for instance, [10] for privacy compliance.
Although the focus of goal-oriented requirement engi-
neering approaches is on producing software requirements
instead of metrics, they highlight important considerations
when modelling technical systems and the surrounding
organisation, such as system inter-dependencies or the rela-
tionship between stakeholders of different natures and their
business objectives.
2.4 Goal Question Metric Methodologies
The Goal Question Metric (GQM) methodology is a refer-
ence for goal-driven measurement in software engineering.
The original formulation by Basili and Weiss [2] defined the
foundations of the method as a succession of steps: establish
goals, formulate questions from the goals, design and per-
form data measurements based on the questions. As such,
this generic basis provides little more than “formulate ques-
tions” to support the contextualisation of measurements. In
addition, the initial “goals” use no particular template and
make no reference to business objectives.
Later evolutions of GQM refined the methodology in
order to address its shortcomings. Goal Question Indicator
Measurement (GQ(I)M) [20] refined the early goal estab-
lishing steps by explicitly referring to top business goals
and adding goal refinement and subgoal derivation steps.
The resulting indicators and measurements are, therefore,
explicitly aligned with business objectives. This alignment is
top-down only however: GQ(I)M provides little indication
as to how feedback from measurements could influence
business objectives or the priorities between them. In addi-
tion, GQ(I)M does not provide well-defined templates but
relies mainly on natural language questions to drive the
process, which also limits its traceability.
GQM+ Strategies [1] is another extension of GQM that
focuses on alignment with business objectives. The method
uses templates to describe business objectives in terms of
object, context and relation with other goals. This degree of
formalism makes the approach more traceable and reusable.
It does not encompass security however, and therefore does
not contextualise the particular aspects of security goals
and their interactions with business goals, namely, how
security goals often conflict with business goals (e.g., how
ensuring the confidentiality of data may require to reduce
its availability), and how security concerns crosscut organ-
isations and affect the (potentially conflicting) viewpoints
of different stakeholders (e.g., CISO, policy makers and
third parties). Finally, unlike goals which have well-defined
templates, metrics are not captured in a systematic fashion.
This leaves a number of open questions regarding the ap-
plicability of the method to security metrics, for instance:
What is the metric’s measurement method? What is the
interpretation of the measurement? Which stakeholders are
to be informed of the results, and with what frequency?
2.5 Summary and positioning
The state of the art is summarised in Table 1:
● Standard Information Security metrics and goal-
driven approaches for security do not or very par-
tially address the issue of alignment. Furthermore,
contextualisation of technical and organisational fac-
tors is limited within such approaches.
4● Goal-oriented requirements engineering and GQM
approaches do address the issues of contextualisation
and alignment, however, these approaches are not
specific to security and its particular trade-offs (e.g.,
business goals and security goals conflicting with
each other).
As shown in Table 1, existing approaches do not ad-
dress these challenges fully. A comprehensive framework
is required that addresses the problems of contextualisation
and alignment in a holistic fashion. Note that the problem
cannot simply be addressed by combining arbitrary features
from multiple approaches. As shown in Fig. 1, a systematic
approach is needed whereby business objectives are step-
wise refined into security metrics but traceability is main-
tained from metrics back to the business objectives as the
organisation and its systems (and security controls) evolve.
SYMBIOSIS, discussed next, aims to address these issues.
3 THE SYMBIOSIS APPROACH
3.1 Overview
The SYMBIOSIS methodology consists of 4 main steps,
shown in Figure 2:
1) Define business objectives and refine them recur-
sively into sub-objectives of a finer granularity.
2) When the refinement of business objectives reaches
a manageable granularity, derive security measure-
ment goals that capture the achievement of such
objectives.
3) From security measurement goals, derive security
metrics via questions (in a GQM fashion).
4) Once security metrics are established, feedback re-
sults to the related business objectives and update
the whole model accordingly.
The approach follows the overall structure of a GQM
methodology (business objective decomposition via tem-
plates and use of questions to derive metrics) enriched with
specific security elements, namely templates for security
measurement goals and security metrics. These are inspired
from standard Information Security metrics and goal-driven
approaches to security which do provide security-specific
models and templates yet lack the structure and method-
ological rigour of GQM (cf. Table 1). While presenting the
methodology, we will draw the reader’s attention towards
the following novel contributions of SYMBIOSIS:
● The ability to capture the complexity of a technical
system, of an organisation, and of the interplay be-
tween the two.● The ability to capture orthogonal dimensions of the
situation, including regulatory compliance, privacy
policies, privacy control and enforcement, and oper-
ational considerations when facing a security event.● The ability to adapt the granularity of the modelling
from the global strategic goals of a large organisation
down to individual systems and stakeholders.
3.2 Sample use-case
For the purposes of demonstration, we focus on the case
of JP Morgan, one of the case studies considered in this
work [11], [18], [12], [17]. Just like any financial institution
in the US, JP Morgan has a continuing obligation under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 “to respect the privacy of
its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality
of those customers’ nonpublic personal information”. In
2014, JP Morgan was compromised by hackers, stealing
account holder contact information (including names, ad-
dresses, phone numbers and email addresses) for 76 million
households and 7 million small businesses. The following
sections use this particular use case to illustrate the use of
SYMBIOSIS in an organisation.
3.3 Step 1: Define and derive business objectives
Step 1.1: Define top-level business objectives
The first step of SYMBIOSIS is to identify the business
objectives that drive the organisation’s efforts. These high-
level objectives will constitute the underlying motivation for
the entire measurement process and are essential to the suc-
cessful implementation and maintenance of a measurement
program.
For the purpose of successfully eliciting business objec-
tives, a team-setting whereby the measurement team will
have the opportunity to interview and discuss with higher-
level managers and strategic decision makers is advisable.
Organisation-wide documentation is a key starting point for
the discussion, including for instance:
● Findings of recent assessments (threat landscape,
vulnerabilities, risks, compliance).● Policies and documented procedures.● Relevant regulatory and legislative provisions the
organisation should take into consideration.
The outcome of this step should be a set of formalised
business objectives that are prioritised according to certain
criteria defined by the measurement team and management.
For the purpose of formalising business objectives, we
propose the use of a contextualisation template, shown
in Table 2. Once this template is completed, a business
objective can be formulated in natural language as follows :
One of our primary business objectives is to <achieve
purpose> with respect to <object> within that <scope>,
from the viewpoint of <viewpoint> while taking into account
<context and limitations>. Achieving this business objective will
impact/affect/depend on <other relevant business objectives>.
Step 1.2: Derive and refine sub-objectives recursively
Having formally defined and prioritised business objectives,
the next step in the process involves the identification of
potential strategies for their achievement and the selection
of the one that best manages to take the different constraints
and limitations identified into account. As in the first step,
the engagement and participation of members of the higher-
management and strategic decision makers in the process
of defining the high-level strategy is of vital importance to
the process. In attempting to identify potential strategies, a
useful statement to have in mind would be:
5Fig. 2. Overview of the SYMBIOSIS methodology.
TABLE 2
Formalised Business Objective
Identifier Unique identifier for the business objec-
tive.
Object The systems and organisations the objec-
tive focuses on.
Scope The systems and organisations that affect
or are affected by the objective.
Purpose What is to be achieved with respect to the
object within the scope.
Viewpoint Which stakeholders are primarily inter-
ested in the achievement of the objective.
Context / Limitations Contingencies that have to be taken
under consideration when planning on
how to achieve the purpose (including
cost and budgeting constraints, regula-
tory/legislative requirements, time con-
straints, personnel availability, etc.).
Relationship with
other objectives
What other business objectives may affect
or be affected by the objective.
"To achieve <business objective> while taking into account
<context and limitations> we could . . . ".
Once a strategy has been decided upon, its steps have to
be clearly identified and the decision has to be documented
and fully justified. The process then continues by identifying
sub-goals associated with each step of the strategy. These
sub-goals essentially capture various aspects of the higher-
level business objective and aim to decompose it into more
manageable pieces.
Considering that the strategy was clearly and compre-
hensively defined in the previous step, a good indication of
the stakeholders who could be of more value to the process
at this step should be available. These stakeholders are the
people responsible for the achievement of different aspects
of the higher-level strategy; their view of the goals they need
to achieve in order to succeed in their area of responsibility
will help move the process closer to meaningful measure-
ment goals.
For each of the areas of the strategy, relevant
stakeholders should be prompted to identify their
objectives, which are essentially sub-objectives of the
higher level business objective formalised at the beginning
of this process, and formalise them. For the purposes of
assisting this process, the template shown in Table 2 can
be reused. Once the template has been completed, the
sub-objectives can be formalised as follows:
Assess the <object> including all elements within <scope>,
for the purpose of <purpose> from the viewpoint of <viewpoint>.
When doing so, <constraints and limitations> should be taken
into account. This objective is expected to impact/affect/depend on
<other relevant business sub-objectives and objectives>
Where multiple sub-objectives are identified for a single
strategy area, these should be prioritised according to crite-
ria defined by stakeholders and the prioritisation along with
its justification documented. This key step defines important
trade-offs inherent to security contexts, for instance:
● confidentiality vs. availability of user data● intrusiveness of monitoring systems vs. employee
privacy● security investments vs. acceptable risks and ex-
pected losses
These trade-offs are captured by the “relationship with
other goals” field of the template shown in Table 2 and the
corresponding decision can be traced back to the stakehold-
ers involved in the definition of the objective, also captured
in the template.
Once business sub-objectives are identified and for-
malised, the relevant stakeholders should consider how
they would go about achieving those sub-objectives. This
process will result in a new set of steps for achieving the sub-
objective and will bring us closer to realising what would
make a meaningful measurement.
Note: Decomposing strategies to the point where mea-
surement goals can be refined is the first major milestone
of our methodology. It should be exercised with caution so
as to avoid an unmanageably large set of sub-strategies and
subgoals. The purpose of the refinements are to bring us
closer to a point where meaningful measurement goals can
be derived. As soon as a strong indication of what could
be measured to guide and inform our process for achieving
an objective exists, the refinement process should terminate
and the process should proceed to the next step.
Example
We illustrate step 1 in the methodology via an application
to the JP Morgan case. We establish top-level business
6objectives, then derive sub-objectives down to a manageable
granularity, demonstrating SYMBIOSIS’s ability to capture
orthogonal dimensions of security (here, regulatory
compliance, security policies and business objectives),
including the complexity of the underlying organisation,
in an adaptable fashion. Figure 3 provides an indication
of what could constitute a top-level Formalised Business
Objective Template in this case. This top-level business
objective, BO1, can be formulated in natural language as
follows:
BO1: One of our primary business objectives is to apply a
systematic approach to effectively manage security of our
information assets company-wide, from the viewpoint of the CEO
and CISO, while taking into account the legally imposed deadline
for doing so. This business objective depends on the achievement
of BO1.1
Having defined and formalised the business objective,
the measurement team and strategic decision makers need
to consider possible strategies towards its achievement. For
the purposes of our example, we assume that upon consid-
ering various alternatives, the organisation decided to go
with ISO27001/21, since it provides the only international
benchmark for information security management verified
by an independent audit, and a potential accreditation could
serve as a competitive advantage. An example strategy is
shown in Figure 3, which breaks down BO1 into more man-
ageable chunks: implement an Information Security Man-
agement System, or ISMS (step 1), audit it for compliance
(step 2), assess its effectiveness (step 3).
For each one of the three steps comprising the strategy
for BO1, a number of sub-objectives and strategies for
their achievement can be defined. We focus now on
the sub-objective corresponding to the evaluation of the
implemented ISMS (step 3). This sub-objective (see Figure 3
is formulated as follows :
BO1.1: Analyse the implemented ISMS including all elements
within its scope such as policies, procedures, control objectives,
controls(...) for the purpose of assessing their effectiveness from
the viewpoint of the CISO, before the next scheduled audit, within
the allotted budget. This objective depends on BO1.1.1
Again, a strategy must be designed to implement objec-
tive BO1.1. We assume here that the stakeholders decide to
follow the decomposition in “controls” defined within the
ISO27001/2 standard (e.g., “A5” for Information Security
Policies, “A7” for Human Resource Security, “A9” for Ac-
cess Control, etc.): each of these “controls” will be assessed
individually. It should be noted that such a strategy, illus-
trated in Figure 3, is still at a high level of abstraction: the
definition of the “effectiveness” of a security control and the
way it should be assessed is left for further refinements,
namely when measurement objectives and metrics them-
selves are defined.
The last step of the refinement phase that we describe
here involves the definition of a narrower business objective
corresponding only to an aspect of the strategy (specifically
1. JP Morgan was ISO27k-compliant at the time of the breach.
the control objective “A7 – Human Resource Security”
of ISO27001/2) and the strategy associated with its
achievement (see Figure 3):
BO1.1.1: Analyse the controls implemented for the purposes
of ensuring Human Resource Security, including all control
relevant to human resource security prior, during and following
the termination or change of employment, for the purpose of
assessing their effectiveness from the viewpoint of the Information
Security Operations Manager, before the next scheduled audit,
within the allotted budget.
This business objective has now a manageable granular-
ity from which a meaningful security measurement goal –
i.e., the meaning of the “effectiveness” of security controls
and how to “assess” it – can be derived, described and
illustrated as discussed next.
3.4 Step 2: Define security measurement goals
Having defined our strategies, the next step in the process
involves the determination and definition of security mea-
surement goals. Unlike business objectives whose aim is to
express a high-level corporate vision, security measurement
goals aim to help the organisation determine what needs
to be known for the purpose of deciding on the success or
failure of a particular strategy.
For the formalisation of security measurement goals, we
propose the use of the template presented in Table 3. This
template addresses various aspects that we have identified
as critical for the successful definition of security metrics.
Once this template is completed, a security measurement
goal can be formalised as follows:
Analyse <object> for the purpose of <purpose> <focus> of
all elements within <scope> with respect to <criteria> from the
viewpoint of <stakeholder> in the context of <environment>.
This measurement goal is expected to impact/affect/depend upon
<relevant goals and/or objectives>.
TABLE 3
Formalised Security Measurement Goal
Identifier Unique identifier for the security mea-
surement goal.
Object What is to be measured.
Purpose Why does the measurement take place.
Focus What attributes of the object are of inter-
est.
Scope What does measuring the object entail.
Criteria In terms of which the purpose and focus
should be established.
Viewpoint For whom is the measurement taken.
Context What should one take into account when
planning or interpreting the measure-
ment.
Relationship with
other goals
How the measurement affects/im-
pacts/depends upon other security
measurement goals.
Example
In the JP Morgan case, the strategy for BO1.1.1 (Figure 3) is
decomposed enough for meaningful security measurement
goals to be derived. For the purpose of our example, we
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illustrate one such goal that aims to assess the effectiveness
of the information security awareness, education and
training process, part of control A7.2 in the scope of
BO1.1.1. Table 4 illustrates the formalisation of the security
measurement goal that can be formulated as follows :
MG 1.1.1.1 Analyse the information security awareness,
education and training process and specifically the content
and activities, for the purpose of evaluating their effectiveness,
with respect to currentness, reviewing frequency (...), from the
viewpoint of the manager responsible for security awareness,
education and training taking into account the timing (before the
next audit) and risk considerations to define priorities.
3.5 Step 3: Derive security metrics via security mea-
surement questions
Step 3.1: Derive security measurement questions and con-
sider answer sources
With the security measurement goals defined and for-
malised, the next step in the process involves the derivation
of security measurement questions and the consideration of
potential information that could help us answering those
questions. As security measurement questions, we define
questions whose answers help us determine whether a se-
curity measurement goal is being achieved or help demon-
strate substantive progress towards its achievement.
These questions could be of various natures according
to the security measurement goal to which they correspond
and the criteria for its achievement. Examples include (in
this case, considering a given business objective BOi):● How do we measure the scope of personnel and
systems concerned by security objective BOi?
● How do we assess whether the reviewing frequency
for objective BOi is appropriate?● How do we make sure security objective BOi is kept
aligned with the current threat landscape and risk
assessment?● How dowe assess the relevance of objective BOi with
respect to current practices and business processes?● How do security events and incidents affect objective
BOi, and vice versa?
These questions are at the crux of a security-focused con-
textualisation and alignment of metrics and business objec-
tives: the very contribution of SYMBIOSIS. Derived questions
and elements that could lead to answering those questions
are of key importance, and they should be documented
by the measurement team, before proceeding to the next
step. Security measurement questions serve as guidelines
for eliciting the kind of information that will need to be
collected through measurement.
In attempting to provide answers to questions, potential
attributes of the object of interest and how these could
be measured to meaningfully answer questions is a key
step towards the metrics to follow. The results of the mea-
surement of such attributes are what we refer to as “base
measurements” – not dissimilarly to ISO27004. Examples of
such base measurements could include:
● number of security events, attack detections, inci-
dents, successful defences, etc.● number of secure assets, vulnerable assets, compro-
mised assets, etc.● proportion of breaches / successful defences / etc. in
detected incidents.
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Example of Formalised Measurement Goal
Identifier MG1.1.1.1
Object Security Awareness, Education and Training process
Purpose Evaluating
Focus Effectiveness
Scope Security Awareness training content, Security Awareness and Training
activities
Criteria Currentness/ Reviewing frequency/ Contents of the delivered train-
ing and how these map to organisational and standard-regulatory
requirements/ Tailoring to person’s roles, responsibilities and risks/
Delivered at appropriate frequency/ Attended by all relevant audi-
ence/ Frequency of refresher activities - But also in terms of observed
incidents/ observed events that could be traced back to the lack of
training/awareness/education
Viewpoint Responsible Manager for Security Awareness, Education and Training
process
Context/Limitations Before the next scheduled audit, taking into account risk considerations
to define priorities
Relationship with other goals BO1.1.1
● proportion of secure / vulnerable / compromised /
etc. assets.● coverage of risk assessment, security tests, penetra-
tion testing, etc.● dates / frequency / average period for scheduled
maintenance, vulnerability detection and security
patch, incident response, security training refresher,
etc.
Any kind of attribute that, following its measurement,
produces a result that when reasonably combined with
others can produce a metric which meaningfully answers
a question is considered to be a valid base measurement.
Step 3.2: Derive security metrics
With security measurement questions clearly defined and
considerations around data-sources and base measurements
already in the measurement team’s mind, the next step in
the process involves the derivation of security metrics. In its
simplest form, a security metric describes how various data
– used for answering questions such as the ones described
above – can be combined in a meaningful way that demon-
strates substantive progress towards the achievement of a
security measurement goal.
Defining such security metrics requires defining combi-
nations of data that could meaningfully answer questions
and serve security measurement goals. “Meaningful” here
means that these data capture one of, or the relationships
between, the following aspects of the organisation (non-
exhaustive list):
● Technical infrastructure and human organisation.● Business processes and practices.● General threat landscape and known specific threats.● Known vulnerabilities.● Risk profile and risk appetite.● Security policies and practices.● Past security events and security exercises.
The set of potential security metrics derived at this step
should be checked against the security measurement goal
and questions to verify their ability to indicate progress
towards the achievement of the goal. This is the second
milestone of our methodology.
Once a conclusive decision is reached regarding the best
combinations of base security measurements, these combi-
nations should be documented along with information that
is of importance for the purposes of ensuring the repeatabil-
ity of the measurements and the validation of the derived
security metrics. Specifically, for each security metric defi-
nition finalised, a template such as the one introduced in
Table 5 should be completed.
TABLE 5
Formalised Security Metric
Identifier Unique identifier for the se-
curity metric.
Description Including dates of creation,
last modification and last re-
view.
Goal of measurement The measurement goal asso-
ciated with this metric.
Base measurements The raw numbers that are to
be collected.
Measurement method How the base measurement
shall be carried out.
Measurement function Formal definition of how
base measurements are to be
processed.
Measurement interpretation How the measurement
should be interpreted in the
domain’s terms.
Reporting method and frequency How often should the mea-
surement be performed and
reported.
Stakeholders Who performs the measure-
ment and who it is reported
to.
This template extends the approach of ISO27004 with the
business objective alignment dimension of SYMBIOSIS. The
template aims to ensure that no relevant information with
respect to a security metric has been left behind, defining
systematically what a derived metric means, what objectives
and stakeholders it is associated with, or what question it is
aiming to answer.
Among other information, the template defines the se-
curity measurement goal(s) a security metric is associated
9with, the kind of base measurements it combines, how
these were collected, by whom, using what sources, how
these were combined, how the measurement should be
interpreted, how it should be reported, to whom and how
often.
Note: It is important to note that in the process of
trying to define a security metric, the need for a refinement
of security measurement questions or measurement goals
might arise. In those cases, the refinement should take place
before proceeding to formalising a metric. A security metric
should only be formalised if it is considered to be final and
sufficient for the purposes of answering the question and
bringing us closer to achieving the goal.
Example
Having formalised measurement goal MG1.1.1.1 regard-
ing Security Awareness, Education and Training Process, a
range of questions need to be derived. A potential outcome
of this exercise could resemble that presented in Table 6. The
table demonstrates the transition from Questions to Security
Metrics through the consideration of Base Measurements.
The different questions address the following aspects of
measurement goal MG1.1.1.1:
● Q1.1.1.1.1: up-to-dateness of the security training
programme.● Q1.1.1.1.2: reviewing frequency of the security train-
ing programme.● Q1.1.1.1.3: alignment of security training programme
with roles, responsibilities and risks.● Q1.1.1.1.4: coverage of the organisation’s personnel
by the security training programme.● Q1.1.1.1.5: frequency of refresher activities.● Q1.1.1.1.6: influence between known incidents and
security training.
The security metrics provided in Table 6 are not yet
formalised. In fact, they constitute mere indications of a
potentially meaningful combination of base measurements.
Prior to formalising a security metric a quick re-examination
of whether it actually responds to the question and the
measurement goal it was derived from, is required. This,
in turn, may mean change to the metrics. Such a back-and-
forth workflow is key to ensuring the alignment between
metrics and business objectives, and the traceability offered
by SYMBIOSIS helps support this in a systematic way.
Figure 4 offers a schematic overview of the steps in the
process thus far. Due to space constraints, the explicit asso-
ciation between questions and base-measurements that help
answer them and metrics that can be derived by combining
these base metrics are presented for only two of the derived
metrics. All templates are also omitted from the model for
the same reason.
Following this process each metric that is verified to
give answers to the questions and helps establish a progress
towards the achievement of the measurement goal is for-
malised according to the metric template. An example is
given in Table 7. It should be noted that the metric captures
together a technical infrastructure (“base measurement”
attribute and the following 3 in the template), a business
strategy (“goal of measurement” attribute), an organisation
(“stakeholder” attribute), and offers an operational perspec-
tive (“reporting method and frequency”).
3.6 Step 4: Utilise security metrics
Once the full derivation is established, from top-level busi-
ness objectives to security metrics, SYMBIOSIS enters its
last phase, characterised by continuous measurements and
adaptations instead of one-off steps. Several activities take
place in parallel:
● Security measurements, based on the established
metrics.● Feedback from security measurements to related
business objectives.● Changes in the business objectives influencing the
security metrics.
These activities must be performed continuously, in a
back-and-forth fashion between business objectives and se-
curity metrics, so as to maintain the alignment between the
two.
3.6.1 Step 4.1: Undertake security measurements
The contextualisation and use of templates to describe
metrics provide a rich support for carrying out security
measurements. The templates provide not only a detailed,
explicit measurement method, but also the necessary con-
text to understand and interpret the measurement’s results,
and to whom to communicate the results. The latter point
is key whether the results are positive or not: a bad security
measurement should be as relevant as a good security mea-
surement, and communicated to the relevant stakeholders
in the organisation.
Example
The team in charge of carrying out measurements for metric
ME 1.1.1.1.1 (cf. Table 7) performs a monthly collection
of the base measurement, as specified by the metric. It
usually gets an excellent score, superior to 91%, which does
not require further action but is logged and forwarded
to the corresponding manager responsible for Awareness,
Education and Training. When an unexpected low score
(70%) is recorded, action can be taken immediately and
in proportion: the manager is notified that closer attention
may be required, while the different stakeholders involved
(trainers, new hires) are readily identifiable to investigate
the reasons behind the bad score (logging mistake? lack of
monitoring of new hires? overloaded training programme?).
In case the issue increases in criticality (score below 60%,
according to the metric), escalation measures are straight-
forward: the CISO, main stakeholder for the corresponding
business objective (BO1.1.1, cf. Figure 3), can be notified
of the issue, and the business consequences are explicit, in
terms of the affected objectives (BO1.1 and BO1).
3.6.2 Step 4.2: Provide Business feedback from security
measurements
From the point of view of decision makers, contextualised
measurements provide precious decision support. Security
measurement results (good or bad) can be situated in a
10
Fig. 4. Example of SYMBIOSIS approach
11
TA
B
LE
6
E
xa
m
pl
e
of
Q
ue
st
io
ns
,B
as
e
M
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
an
d
S
ec
ur
ity
M
et
ric
s
Q
ue
st
io
ns
B
as
e-
M
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
Se
cu
ri
ty
M
et
ri
cs
Q
1.
1.
1.
1.
1
H
ow
w
ou
ld
w
e
go
ab
ou
t
as
se
ss
in
g
th
e
cu
rr
en
tn
es
s
of
th
e
se
cu
ri
ty
aw
ar
en
es
s
co
n-
te
nt
?
(W
he
re
by
cu
rr
en
tn
es
s
is
de
fin
ed
as
th
e
al
ig
nm
en
t
w
ith
th
e
pr
ov
is
io
ns
of
th
e
la
te
st
bu
si
-
ne
ss
po
lic
y
an
d
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
do
c-
um
en
te
d
an
d
in
lin
e
w
ith
th
e
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
of
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
la
w
s
an
d
re
gu
la
tio
ns
?
●
N
um
be
r
of
tr
ai
ni
ng
se
ct
io
ns
th
at
ha
ve
be
en
as
se
ss
ed
ag
ai
ns
t
th
e
m
os
t
re
ce
nt
po
lic
ie
s
an
d
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
an
d
w
ith
re
sp
ec
t
to
th
e
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
of
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
la
w
s
an
d
re
gu
la
tio
ns
,t
o
de
te
rm
in
e
if
th
ey
w
er
e
al
ig
ne
d.
●
To
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
se
ct
io
ns
in
tr
ai
ni
ng
co
nt
en
t.
●
Sc
al
e
fo
r
ev
al
ua
tin
g
th
e
ex
te
nd
of
al
ig
nm
en
t.
●
N
um
be
r
am
on
gs
tt
ho
se
w
hi
ch
w
er
e
no
td
ee
m
ed
“u
p-
to
-d
at
e”
.
●
N
um
be
r
am
on
gs
t
th
os
e
no
t
de
em
ed
“u
p-
to
-d
at
e”
th
at
w
er
e
sc
he
du
le
d
fo
r
re
vi
ew
.
●
Li
st
m
ap
pi
ng
tr
ai
ni
ng
se
ct
io
ns
to
po
lic
y
se
ct
io
ns
.
●
Li
st
m
ap
pi
ng
tr
ai
ni
ng
se
ct
io
ns
to
re
le
va
nt
re
gu
la
to
ry
an
d
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
,w
he
re
ve
r
po
ss
ib
le
.
●
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
tr
ai
ni
ng
aw
ar
en
es
s
co
nt
en
tt
ha
th
as
be
en
as
se
ss
ed
fo
r
al
ig
nm
en
t
w
ith
th
e
m
os
t
cu
rr
en
t
po
lic
ie
s
an
d
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
of
th
e
or
-
ga
ni
sa
tio
n
an
d
th
e
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
of
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
la
w
s
an
d
re
gu
la
tio
ns
.
●
Ex
te
nd
to
w
hi
ch
tr
ai
ni
ng
aw
ar
en
es
s
co
nt
en
t
w
as
de
em
ed
to
be
in
lin
e
w
ith
:a
)c
om
pa
ny
po
lic
y
an
d
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
b)
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
or
ap
-
pl
ic
ab
le
la
w
s
an
d
re
gu
la
tio
ns
.d
ur
in
g
th
e
la
st
al
ig
nm
en
te
va
lu
at
io
n.
●
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
tr
ai
ni
ng
aw
ar
en
es
s
co
nt
en
tt
ha
th
as
no
tb
ee
n
de
em
ed
as
“a
lig
ne
d
an
d
up
-t
o-
da
te
”
du
ri
ng
th
e
la
st
al
ig
nm
en
t
ev
al
ua
tio
n,
fo
r
w
hi
ch
up
da
tin
g
ha
s
be
en
sc
he
du
le
d
be
fo
re
th
e
ne
xt
co
rr
ec
tn
es
s
ev
al
ua
tio
n.
●
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
tr
ai
ni
ng
aw
ar
en
es
s
co
nt
en
tf
or
w
hi
ch
al
ig
nm
en
te
va
l-
ua
tio
ns
ha
ve
be
en
be
en
co
nd
uc
te
d
at
de
fin
ed
in
te
rv
al
s.
Q
1.
1.
1.
1.
2
H
ow
w
ou
ld
w
e
go
ab
ou
t
as
se
ss
in
g
th
e
re
vi
ew
in
g
fr
eq
ue
nc
y?
●
D
at
e
of
pr
ev
io
us
tr
ai
ni
ng
co
nt
en
tr
ev
ie
w
s.
●
D
at
e-
lo
g
fo
r
al
lp
re
vi
ou
s
re
vi
ew
s.
●
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
w
ith
w
hi
ch
tr
ai
ni
ng
co
nt
en
t
is
be
in
g
re
vi
ew
ed
to
de
te
r-
m
in
e
its
al
ig
nm
en
t
w
ith
th
e
m
os
t
cu
rr
en
t
po
lic
ie
s
an
d
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
of
th
e
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n
an
d
th
e
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
of
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
la
w
s
an
d
re
gu
la
tio
ns
.
Q
1.
1.
1.
1.
3
H
ow
w
ou
ld
w
e
go
ab
ou
t
as
se
ss
in
g
w
he
th
er
th
e
co
nt
en
to
ft
he
de
liv
er
ed
tr
ai
ni
ng
is
ta
ilo
re
d
to
ro
le
s
/
re
sp
on
si
bi
l-
iti
es
an
d
ri
sk
s?
●
Tr
ai
ni
ng
do
cu
m
en
ta
tio
n
in
se
ct
io
ns
.
●
Po
lic
y
do
cu
m
en
ta
tio
n
in
se
ct
io
ns
.
●
Li
st
m
ap
pi
ng
tr
ai
ni
ng
se
ct
io
ns
to
po
lic
y
se
ct
io
ns
.
●
Sc
al
e
fo
r
ev
al
ua
tin
g
th
e
ex
te
nd
of
ta
ilo
ri
ng
.
●
Ex
te
nd
to
w
hi
ch
se
cu
ri
ty
aw
ar
en
es
s
tr
ai
ni
ng
co
nt
en
t
ta
ilo
rs
ea
ch
se
ct
io
n
to
jo
b
ro
le
s
an
d
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s.
Q
1.
1.
1.
1.
4
H
ow
w
ou
ld
w
e
go
ab
ou
t
as
se
ss
in
g
w
he
th
er
th
e
tr
ai
ni
ng
is
at
te
nd
ed
/
co
m
pl
et
ed
by
ev
er
yo
ne
w
ho
sh
ou
ld
at
te
nd
it/
co
m
pl
et
e
it?
●
N
um
be
ro
fn
ew
hi
re
s
th
at
to
ok
th
e
tr
ai
ni
ng
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
N
um
be
r
of
ne
w
hi
re
s
th
at
sa
tis
fa
ct
or
ily
co
m
pl
et
ed
th
e
tr
ai
ni
ng
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
To
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
ne
w
hi
re
s
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
N
um
be
r
of
em
pl
oy
ee
s
th
at
to
ok
th
e
re
fr
es
he
r
tr
ai
ni
ng
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
N
um
be
r
of
em
pl
oy
ee
s
th
at
sa
tis
fa
ct
or
ily
co
m
pl
et
ed
th
e
re
fr
es
he
r
tr
ai
n-
in
g
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
To
ta
lo
fe
m
pl
oy
ee
s
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
ne
w
hi
re
s
w
ho
ha
ve
ta
ke
n
th
e
in
du
ct
io
n
tr
ai
ni
ng
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
ne
w
hi
re
s
w
ho
ha
ve
sa
tis
fa
ct
or
ily
co
m
pl
et
ed
th
e
in
-
du
ct
io
n
tr
ai
ni
ng
th
at
is
re
le
va
nt
to
th
ei
r
jo
b
fu
nc
tio
n,
pr
io
r
re
ce
iv
in
g
ac
ce
ss
ri
gh
ts
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
em
pl
oy
ee
s
w
ho
to
ok
th
ei
rp
er
io
di
c
se
cu
ri
ty
aw
ar
en
es
s
tr
ai
ni
ng
re
fr
es
he
r
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
em
pl
oy
ee
s
w
ho
ha
ve
sa
tis
fa
ct
or
ily
co
m
pl
et
ed
th
ei
r
pe
ri
od
ic
se
cu
ri
ty
aw
ar
en
es
s
tr
ai
ni
ng
re
fr
es
he
r
re
le
va
nt
to
th
ei
r
jo
b
fu
nc
tio
n
du
ri
ng
th
is
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
Q
1.
1.
1.
1.
5
H
ow
w
ou
ld
w
e
go
ab
ou
t
as
se
ss
in
g
w
he
th
er
re
-
fr
es
he
r
ac
tiv
iti
es
ar
e
de
liv
er
ed
as
fr
eq
ue
nt
ly
as
ne
ce
ss
ar
y?
●
D
at
e
of
pr
ev
io
us
re
fr
es
he
r
tr
ai
ni
ng
.
●
D
at
e-
lo
g
of
al
lp
re
vi
ou
s
re
fr
es
he
r
tr
ai
ni
ng
s.
●
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
w
ith
w
hi
ch
se
cu
ri
ty
aw
ar
en
es
s
re
fr
es
he
rt
ra
in
in
g
is
be
in
g
de
liv
er
ed
.
Q
1.
1.
1.
1.
6
H
ow
w
ou
ld
w
e
go
ab
ou
t
as
se
ss
in
g
w
he
th
er
th
e
tr
ai
ni
ng
is
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
ith
an
y
in
ci
de
nt
s
/
ob
se
rv
ed
ev
en
ts
?
●
N
um
be
r
of
in
ci
de
nt
s
tr
ac
ed
ba
ck
to
hu
m
an
fa
ct
or
s
in
th
e
pa
st
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
.
●
To
ta
l
nu
m
be
r
of
in
ci
de
nt
s
in
th
e
pa
st
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
fo
r
w
hi
ch
ro
ot
-
ca
us
e
an
al
ys
is
ha
s
be
en
pe
rf
or
m
ed
.
●
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
se
cu
ri
ty
in
ci
de
nt
s
fo
r
w
hi
ch
ro
ot
ca
us
e
an
al
ys
is
co
n-
du
ct
ed
in
th
e
pa
st
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
ri
od
de
te
rm
in
ed
th
at
ro
ot
ca
us
e
w
as
a
“h
um
an
fa
ct
or
”
fa
ilu
re
.
12
TABLE 7
Example of a Formalised Security Metric
Identifier ME 1.1.1.1.1
Description Metric to determine the effectiveness of the process in place for delivering training to
new hires in terms of its successful completion. <creation Date/Last reviewed/modified
date>
Goal of measurement MG 1.1.1.1 (Q1.1.1.1.4)
Base measurement Number of new hires that took the training during this reporting period. Number of
new hires that satisfactorily completed the training during this reporting period. Total
number of new hires during this reporting period.
Measurement method Count log entries within this reporting period where the field of new-hire awareness
training is designated as “attended”/ the outcome is designated as “successfully
completed” and the date is within the reporting period of interest
Measurement function (Number of new hires that satisfactorily completed the training during this reporting
period. /Number of new hires that took the training during this reporting period. )* 100
Measurement interpretation 0-60% Intervention is required - we need to determine what hinders the effectiveness of
the process. 61-90% We need to watch the metric closely as it might indicate something
needs to be altered 91-100% No need for change.
Reporting method and frequency Monthly collection of base measurements, quarterly analysis and reporting of selected
measurements. The use of a bar chart with different colour-coded bars based on the
interpretation of the measurement could make for a valuable reporting method
Stakeholder Manager responsible for security Awareness, Education and Training. (and anyone else
responsible for communicating this metric higher up the hierarchy).
global business scheme established during the goal elici-
tation and derivation process. In case these results do not
align with expectations, business objectives can be adapted
accordingly to prescribe more realistic goals for the organi-
sation, or new strategies can be adopted to tackle the issue
at play. This activity is key notably to deal with dynamic
technologies and emerging threat actors that can rapidly
change the threat landscape: decision makers need to stay
informed to be reactive to the technical and technological
context.
Example
After a series of low scores measured for metric ME 1.1.1.1.1,
the manager responsible for Awareness, Education and
Training (main associated stakeholder) investigated and
identified that the training team was under-staffed com-
pared to a recent increase in recruitment. Provision for
expanding the training team is requested to the higher
management, justified with a synthetic history of measure-
ments and the global business consequences of the current
situation.
3.6.3 Step 4.3: Adapt metrics to changing business objec-
tives
Although not as fast-paced as modern threat landscapes,
business objectives are also expected to change during the
lifetime of an organisation – be it for pure business reasons
or in reaction to changes in the security environment. Hav-
ing an explicit model of business goals and the traceability
to security metrics provides a support for managing such
change. In case a business objective is added, removed or
changed, the associated objectives are explicitly identified,
and the consequences of the change can be anticipated.
The consequences in terms of metrics can be worked out
incrementally, starting from the previous known situation.
Example
Given an increase in the sophistication of social engineering
attacks, the CISO of the company decides to harden the pro-
tections of the organisation against it. The change in policy
is the following: the initial mandatory Security Awareness
training for all new employees must now be complemented
by a refresher every 6 months. On one hand, the existing
resources allocated for the training objective (Business Ob-
jective BO1.1.1) give an indicator of the expected invest-
ment. On the other hand, the existing measurement goal
and derived metric can be adapted to reflect the policy
change: the new interpretation of the measurement result –
or possibly, a new measurement goal and metric altogether
– is established to take the new goal into account, while the
increase in logging and reporting activities can be estimated
based on the current baseline.
4 EVALUATION OF THE APPROACH
This section provides an evaluation of SYMBIOSIS: the
strengths and limitations of the approach are discussed
and illustrated via concrete examples selected from case
studies. In total, we applied SYMBIOSIS to three real-world
incidents: JP Morgan, Anthem and Heartland, summarised
in Table 8. For each of these, the methodology was applied,
starting from a (partial) set of business objectives down to
security metrics, in order to identify the key points where
the use of SYMBIOSIS would have prevented said incidents
from happening.
In section 3 we have presented the details of apply-
ing SYMBIOSIS to the JP Morgan case. A similar exercise
was conducted for the other two case studies: a selection of
the most significant outcomes is presented as an appendix
to this paper. In the following sections, we limit ourselves to
discussing certain particular aspects of the case studies that
highlight the strenghts of SYMBIOSIS.
Such a post-mortem analysis allows to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of SYMBIOSIS on real-world incidents with or-
ganisation of various sizes and purposes (cf. Table 8). Be-
yond these particular cases, the goal of this section is also
to identify common security mistakes gathered from real-
world practices, and to illustrate how SYMBIOSIS prevents
such mistakes via its systematic approach.
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TABLE 8
Summary of the validation case studies.
Name References Year Organisation type Organisation size Summary of the attack
Heartland [4] 2008 Bank < 4000 employees Despite regular audits and PCI compliance, an old
server was compromised for months and allowed
attackers to capture unencrypted traffic on internal
bank networks. Tenths of millions of cardholder
records were stolen.
Anthem [21] 2015 Health insurer < 40,000 employees Attackers got access (probably via phishing) to ad-
ministrative credentials with read access to personal
records databases. Nearly 80 million personal records
were stolen.
JP Morgan [11], [18], [12], [17] 2014 Bank > 50,000 employees Attackers infiltrated the corporate network after
stealing an employee’s credentials (probably via
phishing). Months later, a repository containing
stolen passwords and usernames was identified by a
third party and traced back to JP Morgan, where data
exfiltration was still going on. It is estimated that the
account holder information for 76 million households
and 7 million small businesses were stolen.
4.1 Strengths
4.1.1 Breadth
SYMBIOSIS is the first approach to cover security from the
highest level of decision making to the concrete practice
of measurements while encompassing both technical and
organisational aspects. SYMBIOSIS captures key dimensions
such as:
● Technical complexity, for instance: hidden system
interdependencies leading to cascading failures, lack
of isolation allowing escalation of privileges.● Organisational complexity, for instance: interleaved
business processes interfering with good security
practices, overlapping stakeholders / chains of au-
thority obscuring security policies.● Socio-technical complexity, i.e. the interplay between
a complex system and a complex organisation.
These are notably captured via the “scope”, “viewpoint”
and “stakeholder” attributes of SYMBIOSIS’s templates. The
interplay between an infrastructure and the organisation
around it is a notorious cause of security issues, as illus-
trated by the following case study. SYMBIOSIS’s templates
bring such concerns to the foreground systematically.
Illustration
The application of SYMBIOSIS to the Anthem use case gives
a good illustration of the importance of comprehensive
socio-technical modelling when measuring security [21].
The Anthem health insurer was robbed of nearly 80 million
personal records in 2015. Hackers managed to obtain the
security credentials of one or more system administrators,
possibly via phishing. System administrators had access to
personal data in the infrastructure, a questionable design de-
cision, in addition to the lack of encryption of the data. The
lack of understanding of the interplay between a technical
system (here, a database) and members of an organisation
(here, the administrator) is key in that regard.
We present now how applying SYMBIOSIS to this case
would have prevented such a situation. First, consider a
TABLE 9
Formalised Business Objective for the Anthem case study.
Identifier BO2
Object Personal records
Scope Company-wide
Purpose Restrict access to authorised personnel
only.
Viewpoint CISO
Context / Limitations Permanently.
Relationship with
other goals
Goals related to data availability require-
ments (not shown).
TABLE 10
Example of Formalised Measurement Goal for the Anthem case study.
Identifier MG2
Object Personal records
Purpose Correctness check
Focus Access rights
Scope All personnel with access to personal
records
Criteria Access rights must be justified and timely.
Viewpoint CISO, database administrators
Context/Limitations Permanently.
Relationship with
other goals
BO2 and related goals
(partial) business objective derived from the HIPAA di-
rective stating that only authorised personnel should have
access to personal records2, presented in Table 9.
From objective BO2, a security measurement goal can be
derived, shown in Table 10, that specifies the measurement
of the validity of the access rights of any personnel with
access to personal records.
From this measurement goal, a metric can be derived,
shown in Table 11 (for simplicity we skip detailing the
question step). The metric has immediate operational value:
a monthly check will ensure that all personnel with access
to personal records have up-to-date authorisations. Any
violation will be reported and fixed, in collaboration with
2. HIPAA compliance [22], [19] was a requirement for health insurer
Anthem.
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TABLE 11
Example of a Formalised Metric for the Anthem case study.
Identifier ME2
Description Metric to ensure only authorised person-
nel has access to personal records.
Goal of measurement MG2
Base measurement Proportion of credentials with access to
personal records that have a timely and
justified authorisation.
Measurement
method
Check personal record access authorisa-
tion and expiration.
Measurement
function
Number of credentials with justified,
timely access to personal records / Num-
ber of credentials with access to personal
records.
Measurement inter-
pretation
100%: no intervention required. 90-100%:
notify CISO and database administrators.
0-90%: escalate to Managers responsible
for data privacy and regulatory compli-
ance for potential privacy violation and
HIPAA compliance issues.
Reporting method
and frequency
Monthly collection of base measurements,
yearly analysis and reporting of selected
measurements.
Stakeholders CISO, personal records database adminis-
trators, data privacy manager, regulatory
compliance manager.
the CISO and database administrators, and large numbers
of violations will escalate the issue to data privacy and
regulatory compliance departments.
Discussion
This example extracted from the Anthem case study ad-
dresses only some of the issues that led to the original data
breach, namely how to maintain consistent access control
to personal records. It shows however how SYMBIOSIS in-
tegrates several orthogonal dimensions usually not con-
sidered together: regulatory compliance, privacy policies,
privacy control and enforcement, and operational consid-
erations such as “how to enforce the policy” and “what
to do when a breach is detected”. Different stakeholders
are involved, from different domains and likely to belong
to different departments, yet the templates make it explicit
who is involved and in which situation: all stakeholders can
trace back to the original motivation for the metric (HIPAA
compliance).
4.1.2 Adaptive granularity
SYMBIOSIS’s breadth is a strength, yet it does not come at the
cost of shallowness: the methodology is flexible and allows
business objectives, measurement goals and metrics to be
defined and refined at varying granularities. This flexibility
is key to adapt the methodology to various organisations
and domains, from large multi-national companies to small
teams and individuals, while ensuring that specific details
and intricacies can be captured by our models. SYMBIO-
SIS allows in particular to model system inter-dependencies,
a common source of security breaches, as the next case study
shows.
Illustration
The Heartland case study gives a telling account of the
need for well-defined security measurements at different
TABLE 12
Modelling Business Objectives in the Heartland case, highlighting the
critical decomposition of scopes.
Identifier BO3
Object Cardholder data
Scope Company-wide
Purpose Protect (i.e. encrypt)
Viewpoint CISO
Context / Limitations Permanently.
Relationship with
other goals
BO3.1, BO3.2, BO3.3.
Identifier BO3.1
Object Cardholder data
Scope Data at rest (databases)
Purpose Protect (i.e. encrypt)
Viewpoint CISO
Context / Limitations Permanently.
Relationship with
other goals
BO3
Identifier BO3.2
Object Cardholder data
Scope Data in motion across the Internet
Purpose Protect (i.e. encrypt)
Viewpoint CISO
Context / Limitations Permanently.
Relationship with
other goals
BO3
Identifier BO3.3
Object Cardholder data
Scope Data in motion inside the organisation’s
infrastructure
Purpose Protect (i.e. encrypt)
Viewpoint CISO
Context / Limitations Permanently.
Relationship with
other goals
BO3
granularities [4]. Heartland Payment Systems was breached
and sensitive data was stolen despite being compliant with
the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI
DSS). Applying SYMBIOSIS shows how indeed this standard
was deficient as it provided incorrect, arbitrary granularities
for ensuring data protection.
PCI DSS requires organisations to “Protect Cardholder
Data” in the infrastructure [7]. Using SYMBIOSIS’s terminol-
ogy, this is a global business objective BO3 with a scope
attribute covering “the entire infrastructure”. According to
PCI DSS, BO3 is to be refined into two sub-objectives (cf.
Table 12):
● BO3.1: “Protecting stored cardholder data”, i.e. with
a scope covering data at rest in the organisation’s
databases.● BO3.2: “Encrypting transmission of cardholder data
across open, public networks”, i.e. with a scope cov-
ering data in motion over the Internet.
By making the scope of objectives explicit, it becomes
clear that this decomposition is incorrect: there should be a
third objective BO3.3 with a scope covering data in motion
inside the organisation’s infrastructure. In the case of Heart-
land, this is indeed where attackers got a foothold and exfil-
trated unencrypted data transiting inside the infrastructure.
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Discussion
SYMBIOSIS’s adaptive model that can be tailored to particu-
lar infrastructures and capture system decompositions and
inter-dependencies is an important security tool. The pre-
vious example showed how incorrect scope refinement can
lead to breaches. Another key aspect of the Heartland case
study featured a similar incorrect decomposition: despite
repeated audits and compliance certificates, the infrastruc-
ture had an undetected vulnerable public server that was
compromised and used by attackers as a first penetration
point. A well-defined methodology to refine security goals
from global scopes to local scopes and cover an infrastruc-
ture exhaustively, such as SYMBIOSIS, is therefore key not to
reproduce this kind of vulnerabilities.
4.2 Limitations
4.2.1 Effort vs Rigour
One of the main concerns with SYMBIOSIS is the effort
required for developing a clear and traceable relationship
between metrics and business objectives, and also the effort
associated with ensuring that the comprehensive context
for metric interpretation is in place. The number of steps
needed, as well as the level of detail required to fully
document transitions and choices, can make the process
laborious. Yet, we argue that this effort is necessary to adapt
the process to the relevant granularities in the organisation,
which is a key feature of the approach. As our analysis
of major security incidents shows, the lack of a systematic
approach often fails to unravel complex inter-dependencies
leading to security failures.
4.2.2 Limited support of the decision making process
SYMBIOSIS does not provide a formal decision making
process that would enable stakeholders to make decisions
at various transition points of the approach. As a result,
the successful application of the methodology very much
depends on the judgement and experience of stakeholders
participating in the measurement. These stakeholders need
to be mindful, during the application of SYMBIOSIS, of the
methodology’s tendency to grow out of control as more
refinements take place and more requirements are added
and intentionally try to scope and refocus it. At the same
time, these stakeholders also need to ensure that transitions
take place at points where subsequent steps can confidently
be taken. All that being said, it is important to note that
SYMBIOSIS’s purpose was not to provide a means for mak-
ing decisions but rather help stakeholders determine and
gather information to inform their decision making process
with respect to security. Notwithstanding, a more formal
approach to instil confidence in transitioning between steps
would be a particularly beneficial addition to the approach
in future work.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented SYMBIOSIS , a methodology for
designing, organising and using security metrics. SYMBIO-
SIS allows to contextualise security metrics via the use of
templates that capture relevant context elements (business
goals, purpose, stakeholders, system scope). Metrics are
articulated with business goals via a preliminary modelling
and refining of such goals, down to a manageable granu-
larity, while also capturing relevant context via templates.
In return, this modelling allows an incremental approach,
where feedback from metrics can influence business goals,
and vice-versa.
We illustrated the use of SYMBIOSIS and its strengths on
a set of real-world security incidents. These cases show that
the lack of well-defined contextualisation methods, with
a scope capturing all the necessary elements – technical,
organisational, and their articulation – is key to avoid re-
producing past mistakes. The flexibility of the approach
allows for it to be adapted to various granularities and
organisation sizes, again, an important feature considering
recent security events.
In future work, we will focus on some of the short-
comings of SYMBIOSIS, including more formalised decision-
support at transition points. We also plan on applying
the approach to different use cases, and in particular to
dynamically aggregated multi-stakeholder cyber-physical
environments (such as those based on IoT) and addressing
the challenge of goal and metric alignment in such settings.
The multiplicity of stakeholders and the number and vari-
ety of inter-connected systems pose interesting challenges
to both evaluate the effectiveness of SYMBIOSIS in such
settings and develop systematic mechanisms for deriving
and contextualising security metrics in such dynamically
aggregated environments.
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